(1982). The difficulty people have in maintaining a comprehensive view of consequences … According to the expectation principle, the utility of a risky
Abstract. Nonlinear preferences. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. Cognl’tion, 11 (1982) 1123-141 @ t%k% Sequoia S.A., Lausanne - Printed in The Netherlands 2 e study of statistical intwitions* DANIEL KAHNEMAN University of British Columbia AMOS TVERSKY Abstract Stan ford University The study of intuitions and errors in judgment un~‘er umwtainty is compli- https:// https://doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0182-160. (Arrow, 1982). Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that a person performing this kind of task implicitly uses a heuristic called anchoring and adjustment. Contrary to this assumption, there is much evidence that variations in the framing of options (e.g., in terms of gains or losses) yield systematically different prefer- ences (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). tional thing (Kahneman and Tversky 1982). Presents examples in which a decision, preference, or emotional reaction is controlled by factors that may appear irrelevant to the choice made. Scientific American, 246(1), 160–173. Along with two more well-known heuristics (representativeness and availability), people are assumed to use this heuristic in the process of For ex- ample, when searching for a name on a list, it is rea- sonable to assume that starting at the beginning rather than at the end of the list is seen as the default option.
The psychology of preferences.